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Abstract 
 
International unification of national electricity markets may be economically one of the 
most important steps in reduction of trade barriers. In international context electricity 
markets have implications for the performance of export firms. The Brander-Spencer -
market share rivalry model is here extended by including electricity production (used by 
exporters) and competition between electricity producers to study the effects of 
international deregulation of electricity markets. In the model electricity producers behave 
strategically vis a vis each other even without international transmission lines because 
electricity demand is derived demand. This aspect is ignored in the standard models of 
electricity markets. The welfare effects of opening electricity markets to international 
competition depend on the capacity of the transmission line, the degree of competition in 
market for products using electricity as an input, and more remarkably on the distribution 
of firms producing final good between countries. When the international electricity 
transmission capacity is small both countries may gain or lose from electricity trade 
depending on aggregate rents the market unification creates. E.g. with equal number of 
final good firms in both countries the aggregate profits in both countries decline when 
electricity trade is opened. The revenue of the system operator of the transmission grid 
may also play crucial role. The ambiguity of welfare effects carries over to the case of 
large transmission capacity. Electricity trade can improve global energy efficiency: global 
electricity production can even decline with trade while simultaneously the production 
using it as an input increases. 
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11. Introduction
Electricity markets have faced a period of deep deregulation in many parts of the
world. Notable examples are Nordic countries, UK and USA. A remarkable component of
deregulation in many cases has been the unification of national and regional markets. In
Nordic countries, national markets have been unified into a truly international electricty
market. EU accepted 2002 a plan to form EU wide electricity market.
Traditionally in open economies policy makers have been concerned with the profitabil-
ity of the export firms, i.e. with market share rivalry. Before deregulation electricity was
supplied in many countries by state owned monopolies or near monopolies whose prices
were regulated partly to improve the competitiveness of domestic firms. This concern is
still high on the agenda. E.g. recently Finnish government decided to give permission to
build a new nuclear power plant in order to keep electricity prices low for the Finnish ex-
port sector. Deregulation has also at least partly been motivated by the desire to decrease
electricity prices.
Market share rivalry in international markets and its policy implications were first stud-
ied by Brander and Spencer (1985). I modify the Brander-Spencer model to incorporate
electricity trade in a two-tier strategic trade model with electricity production in the first
tier and export production in the second tier. The model is suitable for the analysis of
a small country case where final good producers sell most of their outputs to outside
markets and are at the same time the major users of electricity. This is the case of e.g.
paper and pulp and metal industries that are important in Nordic countries. It is the
easiest model to highlight the importance and implications of the strategic interactions
between firms in diﬀerent layers of the ”supply chain” and the intuition gained from the
standard model can be utilized to understand the results.
The main result of the paper is that the welfare eﬀects (which here are equivalent to
changes in aggregate profits of the firms) of electricity market unification are not clear.
E.g. when electricity trade is opened but the transmission lines have a low capacity
electricity price will increase in the countries where electricity initially was cheap and
decline in the other countries. In the first set of countries the users of electricity will
suﬀer while electricity producers will benefit. In the other countries exactly the opposite
happens. It is shown that both countries can gain or lose simultaneously when electricity
trade is opened. The profits (originating from congestion charges imposed on electricity
firms) of the system operator in charge of operating the international transmission grid
may also be crucial for welfare to increase. When the transmission capacity is large the
unified electricity price can be lower than the autarky prices but the welfare implications
are ambiguous, in general.
The strategic relationships in the Brander-Spencer model imply that electricity price
changes have eﬀects beyond pure transfers between consumers and producers of electricity.
An interesting aspect here is that though within countries the interests of the electricity
producers and producers using electricity diﬀer the interests are partially shared due to
international linkages. E.g. if those firms getting access to lower electricity prices are
able to increase their profits to such an extent that aggregate rents from foreign markets
increase then both countries can benefit. This explains why the distribution of the firms
in the final good market is crucial for the welfare eﬀects. Both countries’ welfare improves
2if the number of final good producers in the electricity exporting country is suﬃcient large
relative to the number of final good producers in the country importing electricity when
the transmission line has a small capacity. This result may also help to understand why
the unification of Nordic electricity markets is widely regarded as a success. In Finland and
Sweden the major electrcity users are forest and metal industries and especially in forest
industry the number of firms in both countries are roughly similar. Hence, unification of
only Finnish and Swedish markets might not have been welfare improving. In contrast, the
structure of Norwegian exports diﬀers from Finnish and Swedish exports making welfare
gains possible.
With electricity markets several aspects due to the physical nature of the commodity
traded must be considered. International trade in electricity requires transmission lines
whose capacity is crucial for the strategic behavior of the firms. An interesting twist com-
pared with the standard Brander-Spencer -model is that with small transmission capacity
the electricity producer reacts passively to the electricity imports.The transmission capac-
ity constrains the net flows of electricity giving firms possibilities to congest or decongest
the line. This leads to specific type of behavior at both ends of the line (Borenstein,
Bushnell and Stoft 2000, see also Skaar and Sørgard 2002) and at the same end of the
line (Willems 2002) and makes the organization of transmission rights important (Joskow
and Tirole 2000). Since I am interested in the international electricity trade I focus on
the first of these. Secondly, since electricity is an input to the production process1 the
vertical relationships between firms make it necessary to see electricity demand as derived
demand more explicitly than is usually2 done. The welfare results depend crucially on
the structure of the final goods market and on international diﬀerences in energy inten-
sity of production. Explicitly deriving the derived demand for electricity reveals as a by
product that in the standard work (see e.g. the references above) the increase in degree
of competition due to opening of electricity trade may overestimated. If, as is usually
done, the electricity suppliers are Stackelberg leaders within their own countries then,
assuming that energy users are competing with each other, then the electricity firms are
competing with each other even before the transmission grid between the markets is built.
Thus, without electricity trade electricity firms are engaged in market share competition
through domestic export firms, with trade through export firms in both countries.
Otherwise electricity trade is just a special case of trade with inputs and final goods and
raises similar issues as other studies on vertical supply relationships starting e.g. from
Sanyal and Jones (1980) to economic geography (Fujita and Thisse 2001) and raising
questions on firm strategies like vertical foreclosure (Jones and Spencer 1991) and foreign
1In this paper I ignore the household demand for electricity.
2Aune, Golombek, Kittelsen, and Rosendahl (2001) in a computable general equilibrium model derive
electricity demand explicitly from consumer and firm optimization problems. They also provide references
to other CGE-models with trade in electricity. In these models energy markets are assumed to be
competitive while I here want to focus on the case of imperfect competition, the issue most often discussed
otherwise in the literature. Amundsen and Bergman (2002) is an example of a numerical model of
electricity trade with imperfectly competitive electricity suppliers where demand for electricity is not
derived from endusers behavior.
In von der Fehr and Sandsbråten (1997) the issue is on trade in electricity when electricity in diﬀerent
countries is produced with diﬀerent technologies. Also in this model the demand for electricity is specified
in an ad hoc manner.
3direct investment (Markusen 2002). Here I analyze a simple setting where electricity
producers act strategically towards both final goods producers as well as against each
other. Final good producers act strategically against each other but take electricity prices
as given.
2. The Model
Assume that there are two countries, superscripted by H and F. Both of them are pop-
ulated by two types of firms, firms producing final goods and firms producing electricity.
The final good firms export their goods to third country markets and there exist nj firms
of this type in country j. These firms use both electricity and other inputs.
The inverse demand for the final good is given by
p = a−Q, a > 0 (1)
where Q = aggregate sales and p = price of the good. The profits of a country j firm are
πj = (a−Q− − q) q − wjαjq − rjq (2)
where q = output of the firm, Q− = output by all the other firms, wj = electricity price,
αj = electricity intensity of production and rj = unit cost of inputs other than electricity.
The final goods producers are engaged in Cournot competition with each other. From (2)
the profit maximizing equilibrium output decisions when all firms in the same country
are identical are:
qj =
a−
¡
nk + 1
¢
(αjwj + rj) + nk
¡
αkwk + rk
¢
N
, k 6= j (3)
where N ≡ nH + nF + 1. The aggregate demand for electricity in country j is now Dj
= αjnjqj. In the tradition of the electricity market analysis I assume that competition
between electricity firms can be modelled as Cournot competition. Results from current
research indicate that this assumption understates the degree of competition in electricity
markets even though there is evidence from experiments that the degree of competition
may come closer to Cournot competition as the players learn the rules of the game (Le
Coq and Sturluson 2003).
In this sections it is assumed that there is no trade in electricity. Using (3) the inverse
demand for electricity in j is
wj =
a− NDjαjnj + nk
¡
αkwk + rk
¢
αj (nk + 1)
− r
j
αj
, k 6= j. (4)
This clearly still depends on the price of the electricity price in the other country and
means that even without any transmission line the decisions of the electricity firms will be
competing with each other. This fact is usually ignored in the models that start directly
by assuming a demand function for electricity. Implicitly thus those models assume that
the users of electricity are not competing in the same markets. (4) must be solved to get
the final electricity inverse demand functions:
wj =
a
αj
− D
jenj (αj)2 − Dkαjαk − rjαj , k 6= j (5)
4where enj ≡ njnj+1 . I assume there to be one electricity firm in each country. With a larger
number of firms the analysis becomes complicated as one must combine the strategic
behavior of firms at the same end of the transmission line (as in Willems 2002) with
strategic behavior of firms at opposite ends of the line (as in Borenstein, Bushnell and
Stoft 2000) and has not been worked out analytically in the literature. The profits of the
electricity firm in j are:
πej = wjDj − cjDj (6)
where cj = marginal cost of producing electricity. Using (5) and (6) the equilibrium
Cournot electricity supplies are
Dj =
Menjαj
2
·µ
1− enk
2
¶
a−
µ
αjcj − enk
2
αkck
¶
−
µ
rj − enk
2
rk
¶¸
, k 6= j (7)
where M ≡ 1
1− ?nH ?nF
4
. Denote these output levels by DjNT (no electricity trade outputs).
The main point to note is that the structure of final goods markets has an impact on
the decisions made by the electricity firms. The larger the number of firms in the home
country of the electricity firm the larger will be the electricity supply. The larger the
number of firms in the other country the stronger is the impact of changes in foreign costs
on home electricity supply. Interestingly also the larger the number of foreign firms the
smaller will be the impact of changes in aggregate demand for final goods (as measured
by a) on home electricity supply. The resulting electricity prices are:
αjwj =
·
1− M
2
µ
1− enHenF
2
¶¸¡
a+ αjcj − rj
¢
+
Menk
4
¡
αkck + rk
¢
, k 6= j (8)
where it is clear that M
³
1− ?nH?nF
2
´
< 1. Note that increases in foreign costs of produc-
tion (whether cost of final good or electricity production) will increase domestic price of
electricity even without direct trade in electricity since it increases demand by domestic
firms since they are able to expand their production.
3. Electricity trade with small transmission capacity
Assume now that an electricity transmission grid with capacity K is installed. With the
grid the final good producers in both countries can buy electricity from both countries.
How much trade there is depends on the transmission capacity and on the strategies the
electricity firms use. To have a genuine role for electricity trade it is assumed that without
the transmission grid electricity price in H is lower than in F. This diﬀerential can be due
either to the lower cost of producing electricity in H than in F or due to smaller electricity
intensity of production in F than in H (see below). It is straightforward to calculate (from
(8)) that a reduction in cH and an increase in cF increases the price diﬀerential if
enH
2
αH
αF
< 1,
enF
2
αF
αH
< 1 (9)
5which is assumed to hold. The condition puts limits on the range of diﬀerences in energy
intensity (noting that enj ≤ 1) and/or number of firms to be considered. In addition the
constraint
enH < αF
αH
, enF < αH
αF
(10)
is imposed to make its sure that an increase in the transmission capacity reduces the price
diﬀerential for given levels of electricity production (see below). Clearly, if (10) holds then
also (9) is automatically satisfied. We assume that (10) holds. I also assume that 1
2
<
min
n
αF
αH ,
αH
αF
o
to make final good production possible in both countries. Finally, I also
assume that
αF < αH (11)
If the final good market is large (a is large) then, ceteris paribus, the pre-trade equilibrium
electricity price in H is lower than in F if final good production is more energy intensive
there than in F (from (8)). The previous three assumptions guarantee that the autarky
electricity price is lower in H than in F if in F marginal cost of production is not larger
than in F and/or final good market is large enough.
I assume that the local retail grid is owned by the electricity companies and that the
costs of maintaining the grid are included in cj3. I assume that the main grid and here
especially the grid connecting the two countries electricity markets is owned by a separate
company. If the transmission capacity is small then the one must specify how the capacity
is allocated between producers. The usual assumption to which I stick here is that the
grid is owned and controlled4 by a system operator (SO) whose task is to allocate the
transmission rights and charging the electricity suppliers for utilizing the grid. I assume
that the SO aims at eﬃcient use of the grid. One way to achieve this is nodal pricing
(see e.g. Borenstein, Bushnell and Stoft 2000, Joskow and Tirole 2000, 2003)5. Nodal
pricing implies that electricity prices are equated across markets if the capacity K is
large enough so that the grid is not congested. If the capacity constraint binds then the
operator rations capacity through prices. The producers obtain the price that prevails at
the node at which they inject the electricity to the network while the consumers pay the
3E.g. in Finland the electricity companies are allowed to charge so called transmission charge from
consumers. The charge is supposed to cover (with "reasonable" margin) only the costs of transmission.
The formulation used in this paper is a stylized version of this practice. One could also think of companies
getting a share of the system operator’s (SO) (see below) profits to encourage investment in the grid
capacity (see Joskow and Tirole 2003 for a discussion).
4There exist cases where SO does not own the grid.
5Joskow and Tirole (2003) show that if electricity firms have market power and congestion charges are
returned back to firms to encourage investment in transmission capacity then nodal pricing may not
be eﬃcient. Joskow and Tirole (2000) argue that if the electricity firms have market power then the
possibility for them to own physical or financial rights to the grid (and thus to SO profits) their market
power is enhanced. E.g. the Finnish main grid is owned and operated by Finngrid, a regulated monopoly,
which is partly owned by the largest electricity companies. In this paper I assume for simplicity that
they do not have these rights. Joskow and Tirole show that this can be socially optimal. Nothing in the
analysis would change if the firms owned the rights but would not take into account the impacts of their
own actions to these profits.
6price prevailing at the node where they are located. This holds since the SO imposes a
congestion charge on the users of the transmission grid. The eﬃcient charge is equal to
the price diﬀerential at diﬀerent nodes. The system operator thus collects rents when the
capacity is small. Electricity flows from the low price market to the high price market. It
is natural to assume that the flow reduces the international electricity price diﬀerential.
From (5) one gets for H price
wH =
a
αH
−
¡
DH −K
¢
enH (αH)2 −
¡
DF +K
¢
αHαF
− r
H
αH
(12)
and likewise for F:
wF = a
αF
−
¡
DF +K
¢
enF (αF )2 −
¡
DH −K
¢
αHαF
− r
F
αF
(13)
The physical nature of the electricity transmission raises strategic issues not encountered
in more common models. E.g. if transmission capacity is small then a firm can congest
the grid for the firm in the other end of the line by not selling electricity to the other
direction as the capacity constrains only the net trade flows. Borenstein, Bushnell and
Stoft (2000) have characterized the possible equilibria in game when there exists only
one supplier at each end of the line but where there is no indirect competition between
electricity firms without the grid (as is the case here). Their result can, however, be easily
transferred to the present model and is collected in the following lemma:
Lemma 1 A pure-strategy equilibrium as the capacity K approaches 0 exists if and only if
the electricity prices diﬀer when no transmission grid exists. In this equilibrium electricity
flow from the low price producer congests the transmission line. If K is large enough an
unconstrained Cournot equilibrium exists. With intermediate capacities either no pure-
strategy equilibria exist or there is an interval of capacities where both the unconstrained
and grid congestion equilibria co-exist.
From this paper’s point of view the interesting result concerns the equilibrium with
very small transmission capacity. Hence, I’ll sketch the proof for that case. Since we have
assumed that wH < wF without transmission line the H electricity supplier will always
supply to F as much electricity as the transmission capacity allows. The F electricity
producer has two alternatives. The first is to adapt passively to the supply K by the
H producer implying that wH < wF also after electricity trade is opened. Its profits
will decline relative to the autarky level but the loss decreases as K becomes small and
will disappear in the limit. The second alternative open to the F producer is to behave
aggressively and expand its production above the autarky level so much that wF ≤ wH
(as for higher prices in F there electricity would only flow from H to F and the F firm
would passively adapt to it). It has to do that for all transmission capacities, no matter
how small they are. Thus, the second strategy produces losses relative to autarky even
for infinitesimal transmission capacities while the loss with passive strategy would be
infinitesimal. Hence, for small capacities the first, passive strategy, is optimal and in
equilibrium H firm exports K units of electricity to F and F firm takes adjusts passively
to it.
7In the unconstrained equilibrium electricity price is unified and the model reduces to a
standard model of vertical competition with Cournot-competition at both stages. In the
congestion equilibrium electricity prices diﬀer across markets and electricity firms have
limited power to compete directly for the clients.
Only the congestion and unconstrained equilibria are studied here. This section con-
centrates on the congestion equilibrium. It exists by Lemma 1 surely if the transmission
capacity approaches 0 and electricity prices without trade diﬀer between producers.
With nodal pricing the profits of the electricity producers are (see also footnote 5)
πeH =
"
a
αH
−
¡
DH −K
¢
enH (αH)2 −
¡
DF +K
¢
αHαF
− r
H
αH
#
DH − cHDH (14)
πeF =
"
a
αF
−
¡
DF +K
¢
enF (αF )2 −
¡
DH −K
¢
αHαF
− r
F
αF
#
DF − cFDF
The profit maximizing equilibrium output levels are now
DH = DHNT +
MenHαH
2
µ
TH +
enF
2
TF
¶
K (15)
DF = DFNT − MenFαF
2
µ
TF +
enH
2
TH
¶
K
where TH ≡ 1?nHαH −
1
αF , T
F ≡ 1?nFαF −
1
αH > 0 by (10). In equilibrium the low price
producer, H, behaves aggressively by expanding its output as the transmission line opens
while the high cost producer reduces its supply (i.e. adjusts passively to the flow of
electricity from the other country). The equilibrium electricity prices are
αHwH =
¡
αHwH
¢NT
+
½·
1− M
2
µ
1− enHenF
2
¶¸
TH +
MenF
4
TF
¾
K (16)
αFwF =
¡
αFwF
¢NT −½·1− M
2
µ
1− enHenF
2
¶¸
TF + MenH
4
TH
¾
K
where (αjwj)NT is the electricity price when no trade in electricity is allowed (from (8)).
Using (16) the welfare impacts of electricity trade arise here from three sources: The
impacts on profits of final good producers, the impacts on profits of electricity producers
and impacts on profits of the system operator. The profits of the final good producers
are (by using the first order condition associated with (2)) nj (qj)2, and the profits of
the electricity producer are (
Dj)
2
?n(αj)2 . The revenue of the system operator is
¡
wF − wH
¢
K,
the transmission rent multiplied by the amount of electricity transmitted. Let co (K)
denote the system operator’s cost of running the trade and θj country j’s share in system
operator’s profits. The aggregate welfare in country j is then (see also footnote 5)
U j = nj
¡
qj
¢2
+
(Dj)2enj (αj)2 + θj £¡wF − wH¢K − co (K)¤ (17)
From (17) the change in welfare as the transmission capacity is increased is given by
2njqj ∂q
j
∂K
+ 2
Djenj (αj)2 ∂Dj∂K + θH
"¡
wF − wH
¢
− (co)0 (K) +
∂
¡
wF − wH
¢
∂K
K
#
(18)
8The main result of the paper can now be given:
Proposition 2 Both the countries exporting and importing electricity gain from opening
of trade with small transmission capacity if a) nH > 2
¡
nF + 1
¢
and b) international
diﬀerences in in energy intensities are small enough so that n
H
nH+1 <
αF
αH . Aggregate profits
in the exporting country decrease when electricity trade is opened if nH < nF
2
− 1. In
this case it is possible for the welfare to decline in both countries if SO profits are small
enough.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The limits imposed by conditions a) and b) in the proposition are quite tight for the
welfare gains to be certain. It is easiest to satisfy them when there exists only one final
good producer in F but even then the condition b) requires that α
F
αH >
4
5
. On the other
hand, the country may loose whenever the number of foreign final good producers is
large enough. The intuition for the result is that with suﬃciently large number of home
final good producers the adverse impacts of higher electricity price on their profits are
mitigated while the competition from domestic producers checks the ability of foreign
producers to gain from lower electricity price6. The increase in electricity price in the
exporting country is a kind of tax (familiar from the Brander-Spencer -model) on its final
good producers which leads to shifting of rents to producers from the country importing
electricity. The producers in the electricity importing country also receive an equivalent to
export subsidy in the form of reduced electricity prices increasing further the rent shifting.
The rent shifting is the more limited the larger the number of firms. The adverse impact
on the electricity exporting country are smaller the larger the number of firms located
there as they receive larger share of the profit.
The most surprising aspect in Proposition 2 is that the conditions guaranteeing welfare
improvement for both countries are identical. The intuition here is that for both countries
to gain the aggregate surplus that can be extracted from foreign consumers must increase.
Since this must happen through foreign producers (who gain from the decline in the
electricity price) whose increased demand for H electricity then distributes some of the
rents to H the conditions for the welfare improvement must be the same. Foreign producers
can increase the total rent that can be earned from the export markets because they are
assumed to be less energy intensive (11). Electricity trade allows them to buy electricity
at lower prices.
Proposition 2 also indicates that welfare in both countries can decline if SO profits are
small enough. Electricity prices do not depend on the marginal cost of the SO, (co)0 (0).
Hence, the larger the marginal cost at small capacities the more likely it is that welfare
declines globally. But SO profits can be large enough to improve welfare globally even if
aggregate profits decline otherwise. This can be shown in the case where there is duopoly
in the final good market.
The case of an international duopoly is easily analyzed on the basis of Proposition 2:
6It is straightforward to show that the sensitivity of H final good producers’ profits to changes in the
price of electricity declines when nH increases. Similarly, F final good producers’ aggregate profits are
largest when nF = 1.
9Proposition 3 Assume that in the final good market a duopoly prevails with one firm in
both countries. Then in both of the countries total profits from final good and electricity
production fall as electricity trade is opened if transmission capacity is small.
Since the SO profits are positive it still can be the case that the welfare increases. To
check for this, assume that c0 (0) = 0. Then, using (15) and (16), the SO gross revenue
relative to the electricity output in H is
αH
¡
wF − wH
¢
2DH
= (19)
8
15
h¡
1
αF −
1
αH
¢
a+ αF cF−rFαF −
αHcH−rh
αH
i
+ 2
15
³
αHcH+rH
αF −
αf cf+rF
αH
´
8
15
h
3
4
a−
³
αHcH − αF cF
4
´
−
³
rH − rF
4
´i
If the final good markets is large then the expression in (19) is close to 4
3
¡
1
αf −
1
αH
¢
.
Then, using (30) (see the appendix), the welfare in H increases if −18
45
¡
1
αf −
1
αH
¢
+
θH 4
3
¡
1
αf −
1
αH
¢
> 0, i.e. if θH ≥ 9
30
¡
≤ 1
2
¢
. Similar calculations can be repeated for
the importing country and one gets
Proposition 4 In case of a duopoly final good market opening of electricity trade with
small international transmission grid benefits both countries if the size of the final good
market is large enough and the marginal cost of running the transmission grid is low if
the country’s share in system operator’s profits is large enough.
Finally, it is of interest to study what happens to the total output of final goods and
electricity in the world when electricity trade is opened. Assuming that there exist equal
number of final good producers in both countries it is straightforward to calculate that
the total output of final good increases since
∂qH
∂K
+
∂qF
∂K
=
M
2N
µ
1− en
2
¶¡
TF − TH
¢
> 0
At the same time the aggregate output of electricity falls:
∂DH
∂K
+
∂DF
∂K
=
Men
2
·
αF
µ
αH
αF
− en
2
¶
TH + αH
µen
2
− α
F
αH
¶
TF
¸
< 0
This seemingly paradoxical result is easily understood when one remembers that electricity
trade expands the final good production and hence demand for electricity in the less energy
intensive country and reduces it in the energy intensive country. In this sense opening of
the electricity trade clearly allows the world as a whole economize on the use of energy.
We record this in
Proposition 5 When international electricity trade with small international capacity is
opened it is possible that total electricity output declines while total output of the good
needing electricity increases. Trade thus increases aggregate energy eﬃciency in the world.
10
4. Electricity trade with large transmission capacity
Assume now that the transmission grid has a high capacity. Borenstein, Bushnell
and Stoft (2000) have shown (see lemma 1 above) that with suﬃciently high capacity the
electricity firms do not have any incentives to congest the line. This leads to an equilibrium
where electricity firms’ decisions are not constrained by the capacity and where electricity
prices are equated between countries. With suﬃcient capacity the electricity market
equilibrium is similar to the equilibrium in the market for any input where producers
are Stackelberg leaders and play Cournot game. From (12) and (13) one can solve the
electricity flow that equates the prices. This gives
K = 1
T
·
∆a+ T
H
αH
DH − T
F
αF
DF + r
H
αH
− r
F
αF
¸
(20)
where 4 ≡ 1αF − 1αH , T ≡ T
H
αH +
TF
αF . Substituting this back to (12) gives the inverse
demand for electricity with high transmission capacity:
wuc =
TH+TF
αHαF
T
a−
Ã
1
αHαF
+
THTF
αHαF
T
!¡
DH +DF
¢
−
TF
αF
T
rH
αH
−
TH
αH
T
rF
αF
(21)
Using this the Cournot outputs of the electricity producers are
Dj =
A− 2cj + ck
3bT , k 6= j (22)
where A ≡
TH+TF
αHαF
T a −
TF
αF
T
rH
αH −
TH
αH
T
rF
αF , and
bT ≡ 1αHαF + THTFαHαFT . The final good firm’s output
is
qj =
a−
£¡
nk + 1
¢
αj − nkαk
¤
wuc −
¡
nk + 1
¢
rj + nkrk
N
where wuc is given by (21) and (22). Since with uncosntrained transmission capacity there
is no need for a system operator country j’s welfare is
U j = nj
¡
qj
¢2
+ bT ¡Dj¢2 (23)
The welfare impacts of electricity trade are ambiguous. The intuition (based on the
original Brander-Spencer story) is the same as in the previous section. To make the point
clear let us consider the case where there is only one H and F final good producer. It
is straightforward to show that the welfare without electricity trade is in H (analogous
equation holds for F) by
UHNT =
3
α2
·
4
(αF )2
¡
G1 − cH
¢
− 1
ααF
¡
G2 − cF
¢¸2
(24)
and with trade
UHT =

B
H
3
−
¡
2αH + αF
¢
3
³ bB + cH + cF´
3


2
+ bT " bB − 2cH + cF
3bT
#2
(25)
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where Bj ≡ a− 2rj + rk, k 6= j, G1 ≡ 2BH+BFαH , G2 ≡ 2B
F+BH
αF ,
bB ≡ TFαFT G1 + THαHT G2. Then
using (24) and (25) it can be shown that welfare can either increase or decrease when
electricity trade is opened:
The ambiguity of the welfare implications can be understood by comparing the pricing
of electricity without trade with pricing when capacity is abundant. The inverse demand
curve facing H electricity producer without trade is given by (5) while with unconstrained
capacity it is given by (12) together with (20) resulting in (21). With the help of these
equations (21) can be rewritten as
wuc =
a− rH
αH
+ τ 3 +
µ
− 2
(αH)2
+ τ 1
¶
DH −
µ
1
αFαH
+ τ 2
¶
DF (26)
where τ 1 ≡
?
TH
αH
?2
T , τ 2 =
TF TH
αFαH
T , and τ 3 =
TH
αH
T
h
4a+
³
rH
αH −
rF
αF
´i
. Comparing (5) and (26)
reveals that electricity trade has three diﬀerent types of impacts on the (inverse) demand
facing the exporter of the electricity: First, it widens the market (demand function shifts
up), secondly it reduces the impact of exporter’s own production on electricity price (the
usual competitive eﬀect), and thirdly, it increases the impact of foreign competitor’s pro-
duction on the demand facing the exporter (demand function shifts down) by increasing
the substitutability in demand between the electricity supplied from diﬀerent locations.
The first two eﬀects tend to expand the exporter’s electricity production while the third
tends to reduce it. The third eﬀect is crucial: with transmission capacity constraints the
electricities provided from diﬀerent locations are imperfect substitutes while with suf-
ficient transmission capacity supplies from diﬀerent locations are perfect substitutes as
electricity is a homogenous good by its physical nature. The net eﬀect of electricity trade
on exporter’s production is thus ambiguous. As an example consider the case where rj =
cj = 0. Then from (7) and (22) we get
DH =
αF + αH
9
a = DF ≡ DT (27)
DHNT =
αH
5
a
Hence, electricity production by the electricity exporter expands (contracts) with the
trade as α
F
αH > (<)
4
5
. This is an eﬀect that was not possible in case of trade with small
transmission capacity.
It is obvious that similar decomposition as was done for the electricity exporter can be
made for the importer giving:
wuc =
a− rF
αF
− µ3 +
µ
− 2
(αF )2
+ µ1
¶
DF −
µ
1
αFαH
+ τ 2
¶
DH
where µ1 =
?
TF
αF
?2
T , and µ3 =
TH
αH
T
h
4a+
³
rH
αH −
rF
αF
´i
. The interesting eﬀect here is that
from point of view of the electricity producer in the importing country the opening of
trade with no transmission capacity constraints implies that the market size definitely
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contracts (demand curve shifts down). Yet, using the same example as for the exporter
(rj = cj = 0) it is easily seen the production of electricity in the country importing expands
when trade with suﬃcient transmission capacity is opened. This again contrasts with the
case of electricity trade with small transmission capacity. The intuition here is that with
small transmission capacity the producer in the importing country adjusts passively to
the aggressive exports while with large transmission capacity it can respond aggressively.
Hence we get
Proposition 6 The production of the electricity exporter can contract and the electricity
production in the importing country can expand when electricity trade with large trans-
mission capacity is opened.
To understand the welfare eﬀects one also should look at the electricity prices. In the
specific example we have used the electricity prices without electricity trade are (from
(8))
wHNT = 2
5αH
a (28)
wFNT =
2
5αF
a
With unconstrained transmission capacity the unified electricity price is7
wuc = bTDT (29)
It is straightforward to show that wuc > wHNT if the energy intensity of production is
high enough in both countries and the reverse holds if the energy intensity is low enough
in both countries. In the first case final good producers in H are definitely hurt by the
electricity trade and the overall welfare will decline if also the electricity production in H
contracts. In F on the other hand welfare will improve. But it is also possible to see a
lower unified electricity price than prevailed in autarky. In this case both countries can
benefit from trade.
5. Concluding comments
The paper uses recent models of electricity trade to model the implications of interna-
tional electricity trade. I have argue that opening of international electricity trade has
ambiguous welfare implications and can be welfare deteriorating. The result is obtained in
a model that extends the well-known Brander-Spencer (1985) model to include electricity
as an input to final good production. In that context the result may seem obvious as users
of electricity will be hurt by the increase in price if initially they have been enjoying from
low prices. One may still wonder where the result comes from since in principle electricity
price change is just a transfer of income between producers. Here the strategic aspects
known from the Brander-Spencer -model are important. An increase in the electricity
price works like an export tax on final good producers in contrast to the export subsidy
7The unified electricity price is A− 2bTDT and DT = A
3?T giving the formula.
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that is optimal in the Brander-Spencer -model. The electricity price increase shifts rents
to other countries that are not recouped by the electricity supplier. The implication is
that the welfare implications of the electricity market opening are unclear and there is a
possibility that one of the countries at the least experiences welfare loss. All these results
depend on the degree of competitiveness in the markets and on the international diﬀer-
ences in energy intensity of production. An important twist in the results is that also the
international distribution of final good producers matters for the welfare, not only their
total number. It is exactly this that allows to balance between electricity producers and
final good producers profits in both countries and makes it possible for both countries to
gain from the possible rents the opening of trade creates. Finally, an interesting result
was that electricity trade can lead to reduced global production of electricity even when
global production using electricity as an input expands. This holds since electricity will
flow to the country where the energy intensity of production is lower as in that country
electricity prices without trade are lower. Another way to put the result is to say that
electricity trade improves the global energy eﬃciency of production.
I have ignored many important aspects that could at some point be incorporated in the
analysis. Among them is the assumption that I have ignored the demand for electricity by
domestic consumers and firms producing only for local consumption, I have assumed that
all demand comes from exporting firms. In this case the welfare implications of electricity
trade still seem ambiguous using the same logic as in this paper. I have also assumed
that the transmission capacity is exogenously given. Clearly it is important to endogenize
the capacity8. Among the most serious omission is the response of other input prices to
changes in electricity prices. Electricity price changes have an impact on the demands
for other inputs and thus on their prices. These impacts can be analyzed only in a truly
general equilibrium model. I leave the construction of such a model for future.
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7. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Consider first the impacts on country H welfare. Since H is
exporting electricity αHnHqH = DH −K. Using (18) the welfare impact on country H
has at K = 0 the same sign as the following expression:
∂qH
∂K
+
1enHαH ∂DH∂K + θH
£¡
wF − wH
¢
− (co)0 (0)
¤
2DH
αH
(30)
The first term in (30) is surely negative as the electricity trade increases the electricity
price in H increasing the marginal cost of final goods producers. The second term is
surely positive indicating that H electricity supplier gets higher profits as the foreign
market opens. The third term is non-negative as long as the marginal revenue from
expanding capacity exceeds the marginal cost of running the electricity market when the
transmission line is opened. I assume this to hold.
The first two terms in (30) can be collected to yield (using (3), (12), and (15))
∂qH
∂K
+
1enHαH ∂DH∂K = M2
½
−n
F + 1
N
− n
HnF
2 (nH + 1)N
+ 1
¾
TH+ (31)
M
2
½
− n
F
2N
− n
F
N
+
nF
2 (nF + 1)
¾
TF
where I have used the relation 1− M
2
³
1− ?nH?nF
2
´
= M
2
.
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Consider first the general case of any number of firms in both countries (remember that
given (10) and (11) it is clear that the number of firms in H cannot be arbitrarily large
while in F it can). It is easy to calculate (from (31)) that
∂qH
∂K
+
1enHαH ∂DH∂K = (32)
MnH
2N (nH + 1)
£
2
¡
nH + 1
¢
− nF
¤
TH +
MnF
4
µ
− 3
N
+
1
nF + 1
¶
TF
Similarly for the importing country one calculates
∂qF
∂K
+
1enFαF ∂DF∂K = M2
½
nH
2N
+
nH
N
− n
H
2 (nH + 1)
¾
TH+ (33)
M
2
½µ
nH + 1
N
¶
+
nFnH
2 (nF + 1)N
− 1
¾
TF
giving after simplification
∂qF
∂K
+
1enFαF ∂DF∂K = (34)
MnH
4
µ
3
N
− 1
nH + 1
¶
TH +
MnF
4N (nF + 1)
£
nH −
¡
2nF + 1
¢¤
TF
(32) and (34) reveal that aggregate profits in both countries increase for sure if the
number of final good producers in the exporting country is large enough and decrease if
the number of final good producers in the electricity importing country is large enough.
Because the countries also share in the SO profits we get the Proposition 1.
